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1 INTRODUCTION 
On the 2
nd
 of June 2009 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published 
“The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law” (hereinafter “the Interpretive Guidance”), a result of an 
expert process conducted by the ICRC from 2003 to 2008. The process has been in 
collaboration between the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute, with the goal of providing 
clarity regarding the notion of direct participation in hostilities. As a part of the process 
culminating in the present Interpretive Guidance, five informal expert meetings took place 
in Geneva and The Hague between 2003 and 2008 gathering 40 to 50 legal experts 
including academics, military officers and governmental representatives as well as experts 
from international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) all of whom participated in 
their private capacity.
1
  
 
The Interpretive Guidance seeks to clarify the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(DPH) as neither the Geneva Conventions, nor their Additional Protocols provide a 
definition of DPH.
2
 In many ways the Interpretive Guidance has successfully fulfilled its 
purpose. However, it is always a challenge making laws, rules and regulations practicable 
as they do not exist in a vacuum. We need to create fair, functional and predictable frames 
around them with the aim to make them applicable universally. The Interpretive Guidance 
has managed to solve some legal challenges, but critics claim that the challenges, in fact, 
only are transferred to different stages of the military operations. The importance of clear 
guidelines becomes apparent in situations concerning life and death, which is a reality 
when making targeting decisions regarding the use of lethal force.  
                                                 
1
 See The ICRC Overview of the ICRC‟s Expert Process (2003-2008)  
2
 See Melzer, Nils. The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law. Geneva (the International Committee of the Red Cross) 2009, p. 12 
 2 
There are two situations creating criteria constituting DPH: one is the situation where a 
civilian lose protection from direct attack because he or she directly participates in 
hostilities, once or more, but without being formally organized or linked to an armed group. 
The other situation is the one where a civilian is a member (by function) of an organized 
armed group and is assuming a continuous combat function making him or her a lawful 
target for the entire duration of his or her membership. A question is whether or not a mere 
membership in an organized armed group can qualify as DPH and thereby activate loss of 
protection against direct attack. 
 
The concept of continuous combat function was introduced for the first time in connection 
with the Interpretive Guidance, and has revived the debate around DPH and organized 
armed groups. “The membership approach” and “the revolving door” (of protection) are 
two topics natural and necessary to discuss under this debate. By attempting to avoid the 
challenges of the “revolving door” mechanism, the Interpretive Guidance requires both 
membership
3
 and DPH for an act to qualify as DPH for a participant of an organized armed 
group. Conversely, membership was not a criterion prior to the Interpretive Guidance. By 
making membership a second criterion, the threshold of DPH has been raised. One can 
wonder whether a theoretical clarification ever can be practicable to operational forces. The 
challenge of continuous combat function is to create a realistic criterion for the 
documentation needed in order to clarify status. Membership based on a criterion of 
function is the ICRC‟s suggestion. An alternative is that mere participation in hostilities 
triggers loss of civilian protection for the individual in question. The latter approach is too 
narrow, and it does not distinguish between “direct” and “indirect” or take causal proximity 
into account. The question is how to deal with the concept of continuous combat function. 
 
 
 
      
                                                 
3
 See chapter 5.1 in this paper 
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1.1 Subject matter 
The legal challenges of armed conflict increase with the vanishing of the traditional 
battlefield as the technological innovations in weaponry have lead to new methods of 
warfare. That also transforms the traditional combatant into a much more complex figure. 
The manifestation of the enemy has also changed, as the armed conflicts are getting more 
and more complicated. The rapid development in technology does not only show in 
weaponry, but also in the flow of information and commando. The state armed forces will 
face a growing sophistication amongst other militaries as well as among non-state actors. 
The notion of network-centric warfare (NCW)
 4
 appeared after the introduction of 
cyberspace as a fourth dimension. With NCW the opportunity to centralize the commando 
expands, along with an improved capacity in volume and tempo, better intelligence and a 
higher occurrence of activity behind enemy lines. From a political and an operational point 
of view, leading multinational forces in international operations with rapid shifts in the 
frame of the conflict, creates a series of challenges concerning targeting decisions, ethics, 
language, religion and culture. A growing level of risk in both international and non-
international armed conflicts, increases the likeliness of suffering losses of own 
combatants. The loss of own combatants can be, as shown in the recent losses of 
Norwegian soldiers fighting in the war in Afghanistan, a vulnerable issue forcing each 
participating nation to map the political climate on the threshold for loss.   
 
Regarding the protection of civilians, the increasing occurrence of non-international armed 
conflicts between government forces and organized non-state armed groups, or between 
                                                 
4
 See Schmitt, M.N. Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees. 5 Chicago Journal of International Law, Law Journal Library. 2004-2005. The four 
dimensions are air and space, land, sea, and cyberspace. In network-centric warfare (as opposed to platform-
centric warfare where military assets operate as separate entities), various platforms are linked such that they 
operate as parts of an integrated whole. It is the development and networking of information, sensor, 
command and control, and engagement grids, that has enabled this transformation in warfare. 
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such groups for political or economic reasons, is of a growing concern.
5
 In these kinds of 
armed conflicts, parts of the civilian population are acting as fighting forces, which leads to 
uncertainties around these fighters‟ status. 
 
One of the main goals of IHL is to protect members of the civilian population from the 
effects of an armed conflict. By doing so, there must be made a distinction between the 
ones who partake in the fighting and those who do not partake, as each category have 
different rights and duties. The distinction between combatant and civilian determines the 
international legal status of these two categories, indicating the primary status of a person 
in an international armed conflict. When belonging to one category, individuals are 
mutually excluded from falling into the other category. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to show how the Interpretive Guidance can be made more 
practicable to operational forces. The thesis will in particular discuss DPH and the matter 
of “continuous combat function”, as the concept was presented only last year and has 
already caused practical challenges in terms of distinguishing between those who assume a 
continuous combat function and those who fall under the category of conducting “regular” 
DPH. 
 
The importance of making categories of participants and finding functional ways to place 
the participants under the “correct” category within a split-second is obvious taken the use 
of lethal force into account. A clarification around the categories is also important to 
practitioners and courts dealing with this difficult area of law. In many ways the distinction 
between combatants and civilians has become more blurry throughout the conflicts of the 
                                                 
5
 See Stirrup, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock. Hearts, minds and guns: the Role of the Armed Forces in the 21
st
 
Century. Guest lecturer at the University of Oslo in cooperation with the British Embassy Oslo, 12
th
 March 
2008, p. 6 
 5 
twentieth century.
6
 Also looking into the future, social, demographic and economic trends 
are expected to interact in complex ways to change the strategic context in which the armed 
forces operate.
7
 As depicted above, the armed conflicts are getting more heterogeneous and 
the challenges of distinguishing combatants from civilians are growing while the 
importance of such distinction, do not diminish.  
 
In order to discuss the matters addressed in the Interpretive Guidance adequately, I will 
seek to make as complete a picture as possible by giving an account of the theoretical and 
terminological background, as well as placing the theory in a practical and political context. 
As the composition of the Interpretive Guidance is explicitly placed under International 
Humanitarian Law, the IHL will create a professional framework in this paper. Human 
rights law and Rules of Engagement will also be addressed, but only for the purpose of 
demarcation. 
 
1.3 Objectives and structure 
Since the study of the Interpretive Guidance is too excessive for this thesis to cover the 
whole document, I have chosen parts of the study that I would like to shed some light on. 
The main focus is the notion of DPH and the discussions deriving from it. This paper will 
be divided into seven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction presenting the topic, 
background, purpose and methodology by explaining what this thesis seeks to unveil and 
obtain. Chapter two will identify the legal frame within which this thesis will be written. 
Furthermore, the legal field of International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed 
Conflict will be defined, and the cardinal principles of IHL will be introduced. When it 
                                                 
6
 See The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2010), p. 37. Melzer, supra footnote 2, refers to more 
and more frequent direct participation by civilians in hostilities after the Second World War. See also 
Schmitt, Michael N. The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis. Harvard National Security Journal. Volume 1. 2010, p. 3 where he states that the presence on the 
battlefield of individuals who are not formally members of the belligerents‟ armed forces is far from a new 
phenomenon 
7
 See Stirrup (2008), p. 6  
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comes to terminology and semantics, frequently used terms or keywords will be defined 
when presented for the first time in this paper. Some definitions will be presented in the 
main text, while some will be referred to in footnotes. Any elaborations will follow from 
particular contexts throughout the paper. Chapter three is an extension of chapter two, 
dedicated to defining personnel categories and key terms central to the topic of this thesis. 
The fourth chapter is aiming to define direct participation in hostilities, and give an account 
of what activities qualify as DPH and where to draw the line. Both chapter two and three 
establish the importance of distinction between combatants and civilians, and between 
military objectives and civilian objects. Chapter four will emphasize the importance and 
illustrate the challenges in deciding where to draw the line. The “unless and for such time”- 
concept will be discussed under this chapter. The fifth chapter is dedicated to discussing the 
notion of continuous combat function, analyzing the membership approach and getting 
familiarized with the expression referred to as the revolving door mechanism. In chapter 
six the challenges and consequences of targeting will be addressed. The topic of targeting 
manifests the four principles of LOAC,
8
 in particular the principle of distinction. It is 
established that combatants are lawful targets whereas civilians in general are not. The 
controversial issue of “targeted killing” will also be addressed as the issue differs from the 
general rule of targeting. As the final chapter in this paper, chapter seven is a sum-up 
leading to a conclusion and a vision of the way forward.   
 
1.4 Methodology and sources 
The method used in this thesis will be a normative approach. 
 
As the professional discipline of this thesis falls under the legal area of Public International 
Law, the sources enlisted in the Statute of the International Court of Justice of 26 June 
1945 (hereinafter “the Statute”) Article 38 are central in this paper. The Article is legally 
binding only to the ICJ, but is looked upon as a general expression of the sources of Public 
                                                 
8
 See chapter 2.3 in this paper 
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International Law. The states might be legally bound by resolutions of International 
Organizations, which only indirectly descend from international conventions.   
The order of sources enlisted in Article 38 (a), (b) and (c), is not to be interpreted as 
hierarchical, although it is natural to assume that customary law is only being activated as a 
legal source in absence of conventions binding the parties.
9
 Furthermore, the Statute Article 
38 (2) allows the ICJ to decide a case ex aequo et bono
10
 if the parties agree to it.   
 
In relation to this thesis the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
11
  and the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
12
 will be of significance, in addition to other 
conventions, resolutions, general comments, case law, judicial decisions, manuals, 
customary international law, books, articles, journals and electronic sources. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 See Ruud & Ulfstein (2002), p. 49 
10
 To decide a case ex aequo et bono means making a decision resting upon the principle of what is just and 
fair. When authorized to make such decisions, the ICJ may override the strict rule of law when making a 
decision based on what is just and fair under the given circumstances 
11
 The first Geneva Convention: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field – August 12, 1949 (GC I), The second Geneva Convention: Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea – August 12, 1949 (GC II), The third Geneva Convention: Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War – August 12, 1949 (GC III), and The fourth Geneva Convention: Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War – August 12, 1949 (GC IV)  
12
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) – June 8, 1977(AP I), and Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) – June 8, 1977 (AP II) 
 8 
2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
2.1 International Humanitarian Law 
In the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the term “Law of Armed 
Conflict” is used, not the term “International Humanitarian Law”. Since IHL generally is 
used in connection with the GCs and the APs, one must assume that IHL is coherent with 
LOAC. In this paper both terms will appear without a consistent system. IHL or LOAC 
comprises the Geneva Conventions, the GCs Additional Protocols, the Hague Conventions 
of 1907 and subsequent treaties, case law, as well as numerous rules of customary 
international law. 
 
Jus in bello is a third term concerning the law on the battlefield, and is applicable to the 
conduct of hostilities once a state has resorted to the use of armed force. However, in order 
to fully comprehend the jus in bello, the lawfulness of resort to armed force, jus ad bellum, 
must be examined, although as a separate set of rules. This means that how the conflict 
started, jus ad bellum, is irrelevant to the jus in bello. The modern jus ad bellum is based 
upon Article 2 (4) and Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
13
 
 
2.2 Legal frame and definitions 
As mentioned above, IHL also consists of customary international law. Customary 
international humanitarian law is a set of unwritten rules that has earned acceptance by 
being acknowledged as law. The rules have derived from a general or common practice that 
has been exercised consistently and extensively, and is the basic standard of conduct in 
armed conflict accepted by the global society.
14
 Independently of the application of treaty 
                                                 
13
 See Fleck (ed.) (2008), p. 1. See also the Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2 (4) “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
14
 See Art. 38 (1) (b) Statute of the International Court of Justice: “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law...” 
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law, customary international humanitarian law is applicable universally.
15
 The aim of the 
rules of customary international humanitarian law is to protect the victims of armed 
conflict. This protection is additional to the protection provided by treaty law, and also 
holds a purpose of filling the gaps where treaties have not been ratified. 
 
Furthermore, International Humanitarian Law must not be confused with human rights law. 
The latter applies in both time of war and time of peace, although conventions regarding 
the topic of human rights are primarily designed to apply in time of peace. This means that 
IHL will often be referred to as lex specialis
16
 in the situation of an armed conflict. The ICJ 
has affirmed
17
 that in times of armed conflict, the right to life provision must follow from 
the rules of IHL in deciding whether a killing is lawful or not.  
 
Human rights law is legally binding to states, which means that only a state can be 
prosecuted for breaking the law of human rights. A person who has committed any breach 
of the LOAC, may be held individually accountable in accordance with domestic law.
18
 In 
cases of grave breaches of the LOAC, a person may be held individually accountable for 
war crimes. Despite the importance of distinguishing between the field of IHL and the field 
of human right, the coexistence of the two will make them meet and cross paths every now 
and then.  
 
                                                 
15
 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Edited by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck (the International Committee of the Red Cross) Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press) 2005 
16
 The doctrine of lex specialis states that a law concerning a specific subject matter (lex specialis) prevails 
over a law concerning general matters (lex generalis)    
17
 See the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Reports 1996, 226, para. 25 
and the International Court of Justice Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, Reports 2004, 136, 
paras. 102-142 [106]  
18
 See ”Lov om Straff av 20. mai 2005, nr. 28”, chapter 16, and ”Militær Straffelov av 22. mai 1902, nr. 13” 
Art. 108 
 10 
An example is the considerable importance of human rights during internal conflicts and in 
international peace operations,
19
 as the LOAC is more unclear in such situations than in 
international armed conflicts. Although holding its regular mandate, the domestic criminal 
justice system is often vulnerable and weakened, or non-existent, as a natural consequence 
of internal conflicts. In most cases the local police do not have the training, capacity or 
resources to control the chaos of an internal conflict, which gives footing to inter-civilian 
violence as well as leaving the civilian population with a severely weakened protection 
from violence and breaches of human rights exercised by militias and members of other 
fighting forces. There are also situations of total corruption, where the law enforcement is 
paid and owned by insurgency groups. This is the situation in Mogadishu, Somalia, where 
Al-Shabaab is fighting to control what has been recognized as an anarchy for the past 20 
years.
20
 The situation in the Republic of Congo illustrates the desperate lack of protection 
for women. An article from the Journal of International Peace Operations
21
 unveils that 
according to data from the UN‟s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on 
average some 40 women are raped every day in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The article continues: “these horrifying statistics only worsen as conflicts on the African 
continent spread and civilians become prime targets.”  
The more unclear the LOAC appears, the greater the national responsibility for human 
rights is. As mentioned above, the LOAC will be lex specialis to human rights law, but in 
absence of adequate rules under LOAC, the human rights law needs to “step up”.  
According to the article,
22
 a peacekeeping researcher with the pan-African human security 
think tank Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Xavier Ejoyi, links the increasing demand for 
police peacekeepers to an equally increasing need to reconstruct criminal justice systems. 
                                                 
19
 See Dahl (2008), p. 23 
20
 See Engdal, Eskil (13/14 November 2010). ”Helvetes bakgård”. Dagens Næringsliv, DN Magasinet. 
21
 See Mbogo, Steve (1 March 2010). “Police for Peace”. Journal of International Peace Operations, vol. 5, 
no. 5, March/April 2010. http://web.peaceops.com/archives/507. Retrieved 15 November 2010. 
22
 l.c. 
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He explains that the fall of the criminal justice systems are the first casualties in Africa‟s 
internal conflicts. 
“Before, peacekeeping was more of [a case of] monitoring ceasefire between the armies. 
Today, it is about protecting civilians, establishing law and order and institutions which go 
with that. This is the only way to make the society start functioning again,” says Ejoyi.” ”  
 
International treaties have no inherent enforcement powers. Each state that has ratified such 
treaties have jurisdiction over their own citizen-treaty offenders, and is responsible for any 
violation of the GCs and APs committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
23
 In 
addition, each state has administrative or criminal enforcement provisions in their domestic 
law.
24
  
 
2.3 Four basic principles of the Law of Armed Conflict 
There are four
25
 basic principles of the LOAC counting military necessity, humanity, 
proportionality and distinction.  
 
Military necessity 
Military necessity permits a belligerent to use only that amount and kind of force, not 
otherwise prohibited by the LOAC, necessary to defeat the enemy. The principle is not 
codified in either the 1949 Geneva Conventions or in the AP I. It is, however, mentioned in 
Article 23 (g), 1907 Hague Regulation IV. Military necessity also applies to weapons.
26
 
 
                                                 
23
 Art. 91 AP I 
24
 See Solis (2010), p. 15 
25
 Dahl (2008), p.45 adds chivalry as a fifth principle. The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2010)  
incorporates chivalry under the principle of humanity, see p.23 
26
 See the St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight. 29 November/11 December 1868.  
 12 
 In the case of Shimoda et al. v. The State,
27
 the St. Petersburg Declaration is quoted: 
“considering that the use of a weapon which increases uselessly the pain of people who are 
already placed out of battle and causes their death necessarily is beyond the scope of this 
purpose, and considering that the use of such a weapon is thus contrary to humanity.”  
 
In his 1863 Code, Francis Lieber defines military necessity in Article 14: “Military 
necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful 
according to the modern law and usages of war.”28 
 
The principle of military necessity contains four basic elements.
29
 The first element is that 
the force used can be and is being controlled. The second element corresponds to the 
definition statement saying that military necessity only permits the use of force if it is “not 
otherwise prohibited by the LOAC”, and states that necessity cannot excuse a departure 
from the LOAC. The third basic element is that the use of force is legitimate if it is 
necessary to achieve the complete or partial submission of the enemy, though at the earliest 
possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources. The fourth and last 
element is, conversely, stating that the use of force which is not necessary is unlawful, 
since it involves wanton killing or destruction. In practice, military necessity is to be 
interpreted on the background of the principles of humanity and proportionality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Shimoda et al. v. The State. International law aspects (11). Tokyo District Court, 7 December 1963.  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/276c23458e6a0d2441256486004ad099/aa559087dbcf1af5c1256a1c0029f14d!OpenDocument 
28
 See Art. 14, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code).  
24 April 1863 
29
 See The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2010), p. 22 
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Humanity 
The cardinal principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction 
not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.
30
 The 
principle is to be found in the Martens Clause in the Preamble to Hague Convention II 
1899
31: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles 
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience”.  
 
The concept of unnecessary suffering is codified in Article 35 (2) AP I: “It is prohibited to 
employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” The concept is applicable to combatants 
rather than civilians. Furthermore, it follows from Article 36 AP I that states that have 
ratified the Protocol are required to test and make sure that new weapons comply with the 
AP I‟s prohibition of unnecessary suffering.32 
 
Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires that the civilian losses following from a military 
action should not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage. AP I defines 
proportionality in Article 51 (5) (b) and in Article 57 (2) (b).
33
 The first Article relates to 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., p. 23 
31
 See also a modified version in the Preamble to the Hague Convention IV 1907 
32
 See Solis (2010), p.271 
33
 Art. 51 (5) (b) AP I: “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which could be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” (Emphasis supplied). Art. 57 (2) (b) AP I: “an attack shall 
be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special 
protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination of thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.” (Emphasis added).   
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the protection of civilians, whereas the latter relates to the precautions necessary in the 
attack of a military objective.
34
 The principle is also in accordance with customary 
international humanitarian law.
35
 As mentioned above, proportionality, military necessity 
and humanity must be seen as a whole. In order to draw lines, one must have an overview 
of the status of all three principles. Proportionality must be seen as the link between 
humanity and military necessity. 
 
Distinction 
The fourth and last principle is the one of the greatest interest to this paper and is expressed 
as a basic rule in Article 48 AP I: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian populations and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives”  Further the definition of attacks and scope of application follows from Article 
49 (3) AP I.
36
 
 
The principle of distinction separates the combatants from the civilians and legitimate 
military targets from civilian objects. In such way the principle of distinction has two 
aspects; one relating to the individuals and one relating to objects. First, the combatant 
must distinguish him- or herself from civilians, second, the combatant must distinguish 
between military objectives and civilian objects. The principle of distinction is relevant to 
targeting decisions as civilians and civilian objects enjoy a general protection from direct 
attack. This gives combatants a duty to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
                                                 
34
 See Solis (2010), p. 273 
35
 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.) supra footnote 15, Rule 14 
36
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population,
37
 and to keep military sites as far away from civilian populated areas as 
possible. In the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law, rules  
1-10 are dedicated to cover rules on the principle of distinction. After each rule it is 
indicated whether the rule is applicable to IAC, NIAC or both. Rules 1-6 are on the 
distinction between combatants and civilians, whereas rules 7-10 are on the distinction 
between military targets and civilian objects.
38
 The distinction between military objectives 
and civilian objects will not be discussed specifically in this paper. 
3 PERSONNEL CATEGORIES AND KEY TERMS 
 
3.1 Combatants 
Members of the armed forces
39
 of a party to the conflict are combatants and thereby have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities.
40
 This does not apply to medical and religious 
personnel (non-combatants) protected by Article 33 GC III. 
  
3.1.1 Lawful combatants 
Combatants are divided into what is referred to as lawful and unlawful combatants. The 
LOAC applies to lawful combatants who participate in the hostilities of armed conflict and 
provides combatant immunity,
41
 as long as the methods conducted are not forbidden by the 
                                                 
37
 Art. 44 (3) AP I 
38
 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.) supra footnote 15, Rule 1-10 
39
 See Art. 4 GC III and Art. 43 (1) AP I: “The armed forces of a Party to the conflict consists of all organized 
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subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse 
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compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.” See also Art. 44 AP I 
40
 Art. 43 (2) AP I 
41
 Combatant immunity grants the combatants immunity from prosecution under the enemy‟s law for any 
lawful, precapture acts of war 
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LOAC. A lawful combatant is entitled to engage in combat in wartime, which means 
attacking enemy combatants and military objectives and resisting the enemy without being 
prosecuted (as long as in accordance with LOAC).  
 
Lawful combatants are members of regular or irregular armed forces (wearing a uniform
42
) 
with the exception of medical personnel, chaplains,
43
 military patients
44
  and Prisoners of 
War.
45
 Whether being a member of a regular or an irregular armed force, the combatant 
must act according to the Article 4A GC III. Article 44 in AP I explicitly clarifies the 
classification of members of liberation movements in occupied territories as combatants. 
The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps that are a) commanded by a person responsible for its subordinates,  
b) wearing a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, c) carrying arms openly, 
and d) conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
46
 
These qualifications of belligerents are, however, not constitutive elements of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict. The requirements rather depict conditions for the post-
capture entitlement of irregular armed forces to combatant privileges, such as Prisoner of 
War status.
47
 
 
The participants of levée en masse defined by Article 2 HagueReg and Article 4A (6) GC 
III are also lawful combatants. The participants of levee en masse qualify to combatant 
status with the entitlement of getting the secondary status of PoW if fallen into the power 
of the enemy, as long as they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. 
There are two additional requirements such spontaneous resistance must meet in order for 
                                                 
42
 Art. 44 (6) AP I 
43
 Art. 42 (2) AP I 
44
 I.e. lawful combatant who has become Hors de Combat, see Art. 41 (2)(c) AP I.  
45
 Art. 4 (A) GC III   
46
 Art. 1 (1), (2), (3) and (4) HagueReg, Art. 4A (2) GC III, Art. 44 (2) AP I   
47
 See Melzer, supra footnote 2 , p. 22 
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the participants of levee en masse to obtain the primary status as combatants.
48
 The first 
condition is that the levee en masse can only lawfully take place on territory which is 
occupied by actually having been placed under the authority of the hostile army.
49
 
Resistance movements that are organized on an already occupied territory are not classified 
as levee en masse.
50
 The second condition is the requirement of “spontaneity”, which 
means that the resistance must be initiated by the population itself on the approach of the 
enemy. The armed resistance is only permitted against “invading troops”,51 meaning that 
the territory must not already be occupied. 
 
3.1.2 Unlawful combatants 
The terms “lawful” and “unlawful” has traditionally been used to separate those who have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities from those who do not have that right. A lawful 
combatant is positively defined in Article 43 (2) AP and the terms “lawful” and “unlawful” 
do not appear at all in the GCs. The Targeted Killing Judgment
52
 explicitly rejects the 
category of “unlawful combatants” by stating that “there is no intermediate status…”, 
continuing by claiming that a civilian participating in combat activities is a civilian 
criminal who in any case retains his or her civilian status. 
 
a) Mercenaries 
According to Article 47 AP I a mercenary
53
 is not a lawful combatant. The criteria enlisted 
in the Article are defining who is a mercenary and are of a cumulative character. If one of 
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 See Fleck (ed.) (2008), p. 93 
49
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st
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 Art. 42, 2
nd
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 Art. 2 HagueReg 
52
 The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice [December 11 2005] Before President (Emeritus) 
A. Barak, President D. Beinisch, and Vice President E. Rivlin. Judgment, HCJ 769/02, p. 3, para. 5  
53
 See also the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries A/RES/44/34 4 December 1989 (UN Mercenary Convention) and Convention of the OAU for 
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, Libreville 3 July 1977.  
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the criteria is not fulfilled, the person is not a mercenary according to the AP and will be a 
lawful combatant if fulfilling the criteria for such.    
 
There is still an ongoing debate whether private contractors and civilian employees are to 
be considered mercenaries. The conclusion after the topic was brought up at the Third 
Expert Meeting,
54
 seemed clear on the view that private contractors in armed conflicts 
could be mercenaries according to the definition in Article 47 AP I, but that it is on rare 
occasions that the requirements for such qualifications are met. Modern mercenaries are 
often employees of private military companies (PMCs) or private security companies 
(PSCs). It is unclear whether or not the corporate element affects the recruitment criterion 
in Article 47 (2) (b) AP I. According to the DPH requirement in condition (c), a private 
contractor cannot be regarded as a mercenary unless he or she engages in direct 
participation in hostilities. This criterion becomes apparent with the corporate element 
present, if the private contractor is hired to execute purely security functions (as opposed to 
combat functions).
55
 For the purpose of this paper, the status of mercenaries is not of 
independent interest as it is not very topical. Concerning private contractors and civilian 
employees, the discussion will stay within the frames of the debate around the legal 
consequences of civilian participation in armed conflicts.        
 
The US has never ratified the AP I and do not find themselves bound by Article 47. The 
ICRC, however, claims that the rule is universally binding through customary law.
56
 
 
b) Spies 
The definition of who falls into the category of “spies” (in the context of armed conflict) 
follows from Article 46 AP I stating that the person must a) be a member of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict, b) gathering or attempting to gather information of military 
value, c) on behalf of his or her party and in territory controlled by an adverse party, 
                                                 
54
 See The International Committee of the Red Cross and the TMC Asser Institute (2005), p. 79 
55
 See Dinstein (2010), p. 58 
56
 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.) supra footnote 15, Rule 108  
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d) through an act of false pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner. The person 
shall not be considered a spy if he or she is wearing the uniform of his or her armed forces 
while so acting.
57
 
 
There is no prohibition against spies within the area of Public International Law. Espionage 
is a lawful method of war and is defined in Article 46 AP I and in Article 29 HagueReg. 
Although not being a criminal, a spy is an unlawful combatant and does not enjoy the 
privilege of PoW status if fallen into the power of an adverse party.
58
 It is up to each 
country to protect itself from espionage by the provisions of domestic criminal law. 
 
3.2 Non-combatants 
The terminological distinction between combatants and non-combatants is constituted in 
Article 3 HagueReg, which also states that both combatants and non-combatants in the case 
of capture by the enemy shall have the right to be treated as Prisoners of War. However, 
according to the principle of lex posterior, it has been argued that the distinction in Article 
3 HagueReg no longer is useful as non-combatants are not mentioned in Article 43 AP I. 
 
Individuals falling under this category are members of armed forces such as medical and 
religious personnel and do not have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
59
 Non-
combatants have, however, the right to defend themselves or others against direct attacks. 
Medical personnel are not entitled to participate in acts harmful to the enemy,
60
 but they do 
have access to use arms in self defense.
61
 According to Article 28 (1) GC I medical and 
religious personnel “who fall into the hands of the adverse Party, shall be retained only in 
so far as the state of health, the spiritual needs and the number of prisoners of war require”. 
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Both medical personnel and chaplains are entitled to be respected and protected under all 
circumstances
62
 but when in retention they shall not be deemed prisoners of war.
63
 
However, according to Article 28 (2) 2
nd
 sentence GC I, they shall at least benefit by all the 
provisions of the GC III.  
 
3.3 Civilians 
As stated above, in situations of international armed conflict, civilians are defined 
negatively according to Article 50 (1) AP I as being all persons who are neither members 
of the armed forces of a party to a conflict, nor participants in a levee en masse. This 
definition of civilians also reflects IHL in international armed conflict.
64
 Civilians are 
entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.
65
 Conversely, when directly participating in hostilities, civilians become both 
lawful targets of attack and prosecutable for their actions. 
 
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof are 
entitled to status as Prisoner of War when fallen into the power of the enemy provided that 
they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall 
provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
66
  
 
The term “civilian” is not expressly defined in treaty IHL governing non-international 
armed conflict, and must therefore be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose, in this case in the light of the object and purpose of IHL.
67
 According 
to the wording in Common Article 3 GC I-IV and AP II civilians, armed forces and 
                                                 
62
 Art. 24 GC I 
63
 Art. 28 (2) 1
st
 sentence GC I 
64
 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.) supra footnote 15, Rule 105 
65
 Art. 51 (3) AP I, Art. 13 (3) AP II 
66
 Art. 4 (A)(4) GC III 
67
 Art. 31 (1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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organized armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories in 
non-international as well as international armed conflicts.
68
 
 
3.4 International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
IAC exists whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States.
69
 The legal 
basis of IAC follows from Common Article 2 GC I-IV. In addition to all the GCs with the 
exception of Common Article 3, the AP I, customary international law and agreements 
prohibiting the use of certain weapons
70
 are regulating IACs.  
 
According to the material field of application of the AP II, Article 1(2) AP II gives a 
negative definition of NIAC, stating that the Protocol does not apply in situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions (such as riots), isolated and sporadic acts of violence or 
other acts of similar nature.  
 
The ICRC‟s definition of NIAC is ”Non-International Armed Conflicts are protracted 
armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one 
or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to 
the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of 
intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization”.71 
If the armed conflict is between the armed forces of a state and dissident or anti-
government armed forces, Common Article 3 applies. The same is the case if the armed 
conflict is between fractions within a state.  
                                                 
68
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69
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71
 See The International Committee of the Red Cross and the TMC Asser Institute (2004), p. 16  
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Given that most armed conflicts of today are of a non-international character,
72
 the 
application of Common Article 3 is of outmost importance. However, AP II applies in 
addition to Common Article 3 if the dissident or the anti-government armed forces exercise 
territorial control sufficient enough to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and implement Additional Protocol II.
73
 As mentioned above, no other 
portion of the GCs applies. However, large parts of the GCs fall under customary 
international humanitarian law, which in practice might create nothing but a legal detour 
for certain rules to apply. It should also be noted that the ICJ has acknowledged Common 
Article 3 as customary international law.
74
 
 
Common Article 3 GC I-IV covers all non-international armed conflicts occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.
75
 The point at which the conflict formally 
may be recognized as belligerency is open to interpretation. Status of belligerency entitles 
the parties to exercise belligerent rights and duties, and it activates the application of laws 
and customs of war to the parties in an internal conflict.
76
  
 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, Common Article 3 is not generally perceived to 
govern the conduct of hostilities.
77
 The Article does not distinguish between combatants 
and civilians in NIAC. Neither does AP II. However, the Interpretive Guidance claims that 
the wording opens to certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the generic distinction 
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between the armed forces and the civilian population in NIAC.
78
 The two categories of 
persons in NIAC are corresponding to the respective within IAC. In IAC there is a 
distinction between combatants and civilians, whereas in NIAC the distinction is between 
what is referred to as “fighters” and protected civilians. Civilians who have temporarily lost 
their protection against direct attack because of DPH represent a third category.
79
 In other 
words, unlike AP I, AP II does not give a definition of combatants, but Article 13 (3) AP II 
is equivalent to Article 51 (3) AP I in the wording of the requirement in order for civilians 
to keep their protected status.
80
 
 
The fact that Common Article 3 has no enforcement is a challenge to the international 
community as it has no means to sanction any breaches of the Article. Another challenge is 
the effective rule of law as at least one of the parties to an internal conflict might not accept 
international regulations. It is not uncommon that parties to an internal conflict see 
international regulation as an intrusion and a threat to their sovereignty. To increase the 
complexity of categorizing armed conflicts, an armed conflict might be both internal and 
international.
81
 That ended up being the case in Afghanistan where the status in 2001 was 
of an internal character with the Taliban government fighting the Northern Alliance in the 
northern part of the country. After the US-led military operation “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” 7 October 2001 a Common Article 2 GC I-IV international armed conflict begun 
in the south and east with one High Contracting Party invading another High Contracting 
Party, while the Common Article 3 GC I-IV non-international armed conflict continued in 
the north. The conflict between the authorities of Afghanistan and insurgents is now 
regulated by Common Article 3 and since December 2009 the AP II. 
                                                 
78
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During the Second Expert Meeting,
82
 an expert participant encouraged a clarification of the 
distinction between IAC and NIAC in terms of the notion of DPH. The participant referred 
to the differences in practice where the Statute of the ICC does distinguish between IAC 
and NIAC, whereas the ICTY Prosecutor‟s Office does not. Another participant stressed 
that the jurisprudence of the ICTY and of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights supported a distinction. However, the Interpretive Guidance seems to have limited 
the discussion by simply referring to treaty law references to hostilities where the notion of 
DPH appears to apply in both IAC and NIAC. For the purposes of this paper, I will not 
stress the distinction between IAC and NIAC when discussing DPH on a general basis. 
4 DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
 
4.1 Direct Participation in Hostilities and Continuous Combat Function 
The Commentary to AP I defines direct participation as “acts of war which is intended by 
their nature or their purpose to hit specifically the personnel and the „materiel‟ of the armed 
forces of the adverse Party”. The Commentary continues: “direct participation in hostilities 
implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to 
the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place.”83 According to the 
Interpretive Guidance the treaty text must be read and understood literally with emphasis 
on both “participation” and “direct”. The activity must amount to participation in 
hostilities, and the participation must be direct.  
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After the introduction of the notion of continuous combat function, it has become important 
to separate the two “situations” from one another, as the legal position differs depending on 
which category the civilian falls under. According to the Interpretive Guidance
84
 civilians 
lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to DPH, 
whereas members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party to an armed 
conflict cease to be civilians and lose protection against direct attack for as long as they 
assume their continuous combat function. The topic of continuous combat function will be 
further discussed under chapter 5 in this paper. Under this chapter the focus will be on the 
“unless and for such time”-concept, aiming to map the criteria for DPH; which acts qualify 
as direct participation in hostilities? Who can lose protection against direct attack by 
conducting such acts? For how long will such person lose his or her protection? How can 
these criteria be made practicable to operational forces?  
 
4.2 Direct Participation in Hostilities 
There is no definition of “direct participation in hostilities” to be found within the area of 
Treaty IHL, and neither State practice nor international jurisprudence offer a clear 
interpretation of the concept. The Interpretive Guidance must therefore be interpreted in 
accordance with Article 31 (1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
85
  
 
The concept of DPH relates to the IHL principle of distinction between combatants and 
civilians and only applies to civilians. It has, however, been discussed whether persons who 
take a direct part in hostilities should enjoy civilian status at all. It has been suggested that 
they should fall under the category of unlawful combatants. The changing of category does 
not affect their legal position in terms of the entitlement to participate in hostilities or 
concerning combatant immunity, as neither unlawful combatants nor civilians are entitled 
to any of the two.  
 
                                                 
84
 See Melzer supra footnote 2, p. 70 
85
 Ibid., p.41 
 26 
Article 51 (3) AP I and Article 13 (3) AP II use the term “unless and for such time” to 
define when and for how long a civilian lose protection from direct attack when directly 
participating in hostilities. In coherence with the treaty wording the interpretation of the 
loss of civilian protection must be based upon individual activity (DPH), rather than 
function or status. Moreover, the loss of civilian protection is temporary, rather than 
continuous, hence “unless and for such time”. The loss of protection is linked to the 
present, rather than the past, sanctioning current activity.
86
 
 
When loss of protection against attack is discussed in relation to combatants, the experts
87
 
seem to agree that combatants are lawful targets even when on leave, holidays or asleep. 
The reason why is that combatants are free to take up arms any time during the armed 
conflict, and therefore it would be inconsistent at the same time giving them immunity 
against attack. In other words, when it comes to combatants, loss of protection against 
attack is not an issue, as they never enjoy immunity in the first place (apart from if hors de 
combat). 
 
Regarding civilians who take a direct part in hostilities, the situation is a lot more complex. 
It is established that civilians normally enjoy immunity against direct attack, but when 
directly participating in hostilities they lose the protection that they otherwise enjoy under 
IHL. More specifically, the protection is lost and regained accordingly with their DPH. 
Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities continue to be a member of the civilian 
population, but their protection is temporarily suspended for the endurance of the DPH.   
According to Article 51 (3) AP I “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
section, [Section I General Protection against Effects of Hostilities], unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities”. In non-international armed conflict “Civilians 
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part [Part IV Civilian Population], unless and for 
                                                 
86
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such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
88
 In the Interpretive Guidance, the 
definition of when direct participation in hostilities begins and when it ends is discussed in 
relation to “preparatory measures”, “deployment” and “return”.89  
 
In the Tadic case
90, the ICTY expressed: “It is unnecessary to define exactly the line 
dividing those taking an active part in hostilities and those who are not so involved. It is 
sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in each 
individual‟s circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant 
time.” The ICRC agrees that the approach must be a case-to-case assessment to determine 
DPH, however in order to so, there are certain criteria that need to be fulfilled.  
 
4.3 Hostilities 
In the process of trying to define the word “hostilities”, some other terms must be used in 
support to decide what “hostilities” cover. The discussion around the definition of 
“hostilities” was brought up during the Second Expert Meeting,91 and although not 
reaching a unanimous conclusion, some relevant support-terms were introduced. 
 
First, “hostilities” must be understood as reaching beyond “attack” and “armed conflict”. 
An attack brings up connotations of a rather time limited act of either violence (armed 
attack) or non-violence (i.e. CNA). “Hostilities” can exist without amounting to one 
particular attack. An armed conflict, whether international or non-international, has the 
presence of arms as a criterion. “Hostilities”, though being conducted during an armed 
conflict, can comprise acts with no direct relation to arms (such as intelligence activities 
like wiretapping the adversary‟s high command or transmitting tactical targeting 
information).  
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Second, the term “fighting” gives connotations to a physical act, which as stated above is 
only one alternative part of “hostilities”. “Warfare” and “acts of war” can be understood as 
synonymous to “hostilities”, depending on the definition of the respective. 
 
The Interpretive Guidance emphasizes participation in hostilities as being the individual 
involvement of a person in these hostilities. The notion of direct participation in hostilities 
refers to a person‟s engagement in specific hostile acts, not to his or her function as 
opposed to the criterion of continuous combat function. The hostilities may be either 
international or non-international, which means that conduct occurring outside situations of 
armed conflict does not fall under the concept of DPH. However, under circumstances of 
declaration of war or occupation of territory without armed resistance,
92
 there can be an 
armed conflict without any occurrence of hostilities.
93
  
 
4.4 Specific hostile act    
The Interpretive Guidance interprets the concept of direct participation in hostilities as 
restricted to specific hostile acts. The reason behind this narrow interpretation is that 
  
“…any extension of the concept of direct participation in hostilities beyond specific acts, 
would blur the distinction made in IHL between temporary, activity-based loss of 
protection (due to direct participation in hostilities), and continuous, status or function-
based loss of protection (due to combatant status or continuous combat function).” 94  
         (Emphasis in original) 
 
The discussion around the specific act approach was addressed at Third Expert Meeting
95
, 
where it was suggested that such an approach must be based on a wide interpretation of 
“preparatory measures”, “deployment” and “return” as it would make little, if any, sense if 
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a civilian directly participating in hostilities immediately regained his or her protected 
status against direct attack simply because the specific hostile act was terminated. The 
approach should thereby cover any conduct amounting to DPH. A critique against this view 
was that the practical situation of armed conflicts rarely allows sufficient intelligence 
resources to keep track of individuals and their desire to disengage. Therefore, one is left 
with no other choice than a literal interpretation of each specific hostile act in order to 
manifest DPH. 
 
Direct participation must refer to specific hostile acts which are carried out by individuals 
as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict. In order to 
determine whether or not a specific act constitutes DPH, the concrete circumstances of that 
particular situation should be of decisive importance. An example
96
 from the Vietnam War 
is the situation where civilians were forced to carry ammunition hundreds of miles between 
North and South Vietnam. The ammunition would be used immediately upon arrival, and 
the civilians would be sent back for more. The question is, could their activities constitute 
“preparatory measures” or “deployments to” or “return from” direct participation in 
hostilities and thereby entail their civilian loss of protection from direct attack? The 
element of force does not necessarily protect them from a temporary loss of protection, as 
there is no inherent rule stating that only the voluntary conduct of DPH is to be considered 
as DPH. The solution must, as mentioned above, be a case-to-case assessment. During the 
Fourth Expert Meeting, under a discussion about the membership approach in relation to 
organized armed groups, the case of a thirteen year old girl who was forced into planting 
booby traps alongside a road is described “although the girl clearly was taking a direct part 
in hostilities…” 97This illustrates one of the DPH-challenges operational forces may face. 
However, in order to construct a frame around a specific hostile act, the act in question 
must also be seen in connection with the criteria of preparatory measures, deployment and 
return.
98
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4.5 Three constitutive criteria 
There are three constitutive elements established to meet the requirement of DPH: 
threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus.  
 
4.5.1 Threshold of harm 
The threshold requirement could be qualitatively or quantitatively fulfilled. If a specific act 
is likely to damage the military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict, the 
required threshold of harm would be fulfilled in qualitative terms.  In quantitative terms, 
the required threshold of harm would be fulfilled by inflicting death, injury or destruction 
on persons or objects not under the effective control of the acting individual.
 99
 It is not 
required that the act in question results in actual materialization of harm for the act to 
qualify as DPH. The objective likelihood of the act resulting in harm of a specific military 
nature or in infliction of death, injury or destruction of persons or objects protected against 
direct attack, qualifies to reach the threshold.
100
 
 
4.5.2 Direct causation 
About direct causation as a criterion, the Interpretive Guidance states that “there must be a 
direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from 
a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part”.101 The 
definition of “direct” has, however, ended up as a compromise between narrow 
interpretations of both “direct” and “indirect” interpretations of causation. The Interpretive 
Guidance proposed to adopt a flexible requirement of direct causation that would cover 
both the situation where a specific act directly caused harm reaching the required threshold, 
and the situation when the act was an integral part of a larger operation which directly 
caused harm to the adversary.
102
 The term “one causal step” has been used as a criterion for 
causing direct harm. When all three requirements are met, it is only acts or operations that 
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reach the threshold of harm in “one causal step” that fulfills the criterion for DPH. A strict 
interpretation of direct causation between the specific act and the likelihood of harm has 
been criticized by Brigadier-General Watkin for excluding acts that simply build up the 
capacity of a party to inflict harm from the concept of DPH.
103
 Watkin also criticizes the 
Interpretive Guidance‟s reference to Improvised Explosive Device (IED) production when 
illustrating the causal link criterion. The Interpretive Guidance differentiates between 
assembling and storing IEDs and planting and detonating the devices. The first two is 
categorized as causing indirect harm, whereas the latter two are likely to cause direct harm 
and therefore qualifies as DPH. Watkin points out that those assembling and storing the 
IEDs may be operating within the command structure of the organized armed group, which 
means that if so, they should be treated as combatants according to Article 43 (1) AP I. 
 
As mentioned above the Interpretive Guidance establishes that an act constituting an 
integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly causes harm, 
fulfills the requirement of direct causation. The reason behind this is to pick up the cases 
“where a specific act does not, on its own, directly cause the required threshold of 
harm”.104 The act may still constitute DPH by fulfilling the requirement of direct causation. 
This means that in collective operations, the resulting harm is not required to have been 
directly caused, in one causal step, by each individual, but by the collective operation as an 
integrated whole.
105
 
 
4.5.3 Belligerent nexus 
The third cumulative requirement to DPH is what is referred to as belligerent nexus. There 
must be a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities conducted between the 
parties to an armed conflict. In order to qualify as belligerent nexus “the act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party 
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to the conflict and to the detriment of another.”106 Unless the violence reaches the required 
threshold to start a separate armed conflict, it remains of a non-belligerent nature like 
armed violence carried out by independent armed groups in IAC.
107
  
 
Not every act that fulfills the requirement of threshold of harm amounts to DPH and even 
though the act might also have a direct causation to the harm inflicted, it still would not 
necessarily amount to DPH. Acts of inter-civilian violence illustrates an example. It is only 
when these acts are conducted “specifically in support of the military operations of a party 
to the conflict”, that these acts constitute DPH. In other words, in order to qualify as DPH 
inter-civilian violence must have a sufficient nexus to military operations or hostilities 
occurring in relation to a situation of armed conflict. 
 
4.6 Subjective intent 
According to the report from the Second Expert Meeting,
108
 several experts agreed that, 
theoretically, subjective intent was a better criterion for qualification of an act as DPH than 
attempts to define an objective list of activities in order to constitute DPH. The experts did, 
however, see that subjective intent as a decisive criterion for defining an act as DPH would 
be difficult from a practical point of view. During the Third Expert Meeting,
109
 the majority 
of the experts found individual motives irrelevant referring to the challenge in determining 
and proving ex ante the subjective intent of the civilian in question. The experts meant that 
civilian conduct had to be seen based on objective criteria from the perspective of a 
reasonable soldier. It was also suggested that “subjective intent to support the military 
action of a party to the conflict could remain a decisive criterion as long as it was 
objectively determined …”110 However, it will be difficult avoiding subjectivity even when 
objectively determining a decisive criterion. How can the perspectives of a reasonable 
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soldier be predefined covering multiple potential situations, without containing a strong 
element of subjective opinions? Accordingly, determining subjective intent must be based 
on criteria providing too uncertain answers. Subjective intent can therefore not be a 
decisive criterion for defining an act as DPH, without jeopardizing the legal protection of 
civilians in a careless manner.     
 
4.7 DPH – when does it begin and when does it end? 
Measures preparatory to the execution of a hostile act mark the beginning of DPH. In 
addition to the preparatory measures and the immediate execution of a hostile act, the 
deployment and return, is included in the demarcation of the time span of DPH.  
 
4.7.1 Preparatory measures 
The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I,
111
 suggests that “hostilities” used in 
Article 51 (3) AP I includes preparations for combat, as it seems that the word “hostilities” 
covers the time the civilian is carrying his or her weapon and situations in which he or she 
undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon, as well as the time when the civilian 
actually makes use of a weapon. 
 
The concept of preparatory measures amounting to DPH, as described in the Interpretive 
Guidance, may derive from the wording “military operation preparatory to an attack” in 
Article 44 (3) AP I. The preparation of specific military operations that are so closely 
linked to the execution qualifies as DPH, whereas the preparation of a general campaign of 
unspecified operations would not qualify as such.
112
  
 
The Interpretive Guidance gives an example of where to draw the line between an act that 
qualifies as DPH and an act that does not do so, by saying that loading bombs onto an 
airplane for a direct attack on military objectives in an area of hostilities qualifies as DPH 
because it constitutes a measure preparatory to a specific hostile act. Conversely, 
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transporting bombs from a factory to an airfield storage place for further shipping before an 
unspecified use of the bombs, would at the most qualify as indirect participation from 
general preparatory measures.
113
 However, the uncertainty of what position those “indirect 
helpers” hold within an organized network remains. As unveiled above, the Interpretive 
Guidance has been criticized for making a practical shortcut by simply picking out the last 
person in a link of actions (preparatory measures and deployment), uncritically claiming 
that he or she is the one conducting DPH. Being the one to pull the trigger, establishes what 
number in the chain of contributors a person is, so by position rather than by an assessment 
of the actual participation, a person will qualify as directly participating in hostilities and 
therefore lose protection against attack.         
 
4.7.2 Deployment and return 
According to the Interpretive Guidance a deployment amounting to DPH begins “once the 
deploying individual undertakes a physical displacement with a view to carrying out a 
specific operation”.114 However, DPH may already have been constituted from other acts of 
preparation resulting in loss of protection.  It is also stressed that neither preparatory 
measures nor deployment are independent acts of DPH, conversely, they are acts being an 
integral part of an operation which meets the three constitutive criteria
115
 that makes the 
operation qualify as DPH. 
 
Concerning “the return”, the Interpretive Guidance elaborates saying “as long as the return 
from the execution of a hostile act remains an integral part of the preceding operation, it 
constitutes a military withdrawal and should not be confused with surrender or otherwise 
becoming hors de combat.” The return ends once the individual in question has physically 
separated from the operation.
116
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4.8 Human Shields 
The use of civilians as human shields represents a contemporary challenge within the legal 
area of IHL. The occurrence of the concept has jeopardized the protection of the civilian 
population in armed conflicts such as the Iraq-Iran war, and in both Operation Desert Storm 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Other examples are from the wars of former Yugoslavia, and 
also Hezbollah‟s extensive use of civilians as living shields during the Second Lebanon 
war.
117
  
 
The notion of human shields appears in two situations: a) in the situation where civilians 
are used as hostages (i.e. involuntary human shields), and b) in the situation of voluntary 
human shielding. Regarding the use of human shields in NIAC there is no treaty-based 
prohibition.    
 
Article 51 (7) AP I states that “the presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, 
favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations”. Any violation, by the 
enemy, of this rule would not relieve an attacker of his or her legal obligations to take 
precautions to protect the civilian population and civilians.
118
 In agreement to Article 51 (7) 
AP I, the prohibition is already manifested in Article 28 GC IV reading “the presence of a 
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protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations.”  
 
In accordance with customary law, the PoWs are provided protection against human 
shielding in Article 23 (1) GC III. Article 19 (2) GC I provides the same protection for 
medical units. Moreover, the use of human shields is recognized as a war crime.
119
 Using 
PoWs as human shields was recognized to be a crime by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic.
120
  
 
The Interpretive Guidance acknowledges that in the case of civilians voluntarily and 
deliberately positioning themselves to physically obstruct military operations of a party to 
the conflict, the act of voluntary human shielding could directly cause the threshold of 
harm required to qualify as DPH. In cases of operations involving artillery or air attacks 
where the presence of voluntary human shields often has no adverse impact on the military 
capacity to destroy a shielded military objective, the Interpretive Guidance claims 
conversely.
121
 The wording in the Interpretive Guidance gives the impression of making a 
distinction between the voluntary and involuntary nature of human shielding, giving the 
result that only the act of voluntary human shields can (under certain circumstances) 
amount in DPH. However, in a post released commentary,
122
 it is stressed that the 
Interpretive Guidance in general does not distinguish between the act of a voluntary and an 
involuntary human shield in determining whether the act qualifies as DPH. Accordingly, 
the Interpretive Guidance claims that the unlawfulness of an act has no bearing on its 
qualifications as DPH. 
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Voluntary human shields do not enjoy civilian protection against direct attack, which 
means that they do not fall under the principle of proportionality (the balance between 
military necessity and civilian losses). However, the UK Manual of the Law of Armed 
Conflict (2010) is open to the consideration of applying the principle of proportionality 
even in situations where human shields are being used.
123
 If the principle of proportionality 
is to apply, the lawfulness of the shielded target must be established. It is argued that the 
issue of the status of the human shields is of little consequence during an attack, as long as 
the balance of proportionality is intact by their presence in or near a lawful target.
124
 The 
enemy‟s unlawful activity may, however, be taken into account in the process of assessing 
the proportionality between the incidental loss or damage and the expected military 
advantage. The “for such time” concept must be of guidance in the consideration of when a 
voluntary human shield can be attacked. Since not much preparation is needed for 
deployment of voluntary human shields, they can only be attacked while being physically 
in or near the lawful target. In the Interpretive Guidance the concept of voluntary human 
shields is a selected example placed under the section of Direct Causation. On the Fourth 
Expert Meeting
125
 the topic was referred to as “quantitative threshold”.  
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A recent conviction in the southern command military court in Israel illustrates an example 
of the legal development concerning the use of human shields. According to News 
sources
126
 the southern command military court convicted two Israeli soldiers on 
Sunday 3 October 2010 of using a young Palestinian boy as human shield during the 2008-
2009 offensive on Gaza (Operation Cast Lead). The two combat soldiers from the Givati 
Infantry Brigade were convicted of offences including inappropriate conduct and 
overstepping authority for ordering a 11-year-old Palestinian to search bags suspected to 
have been booby trapped. The conviction is the first of its kind in relation with what is by 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) referred to as “neighbor procedure”, the use of human 
shields during searches and pursuits. IDF protocol strictly prohibits the use of civilians as 
human shields.  
 
The former commander, Yoni Lichtman, of the two soldiers criticized the court of 
“attempting to please the world”, as a respond to international pressure on Israel following 
Operation Cast Lead.  
        
The mere admittance of the legal challenge of human shields implies that human shields 
are considered to be protected from direct attack, thus they are not regarded, in general, as 
an example of DPH.
127
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5 CONTINUOUS COMBAT FUNCTION 
Members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party to an armed conflict 
cease to be civilians and lose their protection against direct attack for as long as they 
assume their continuous combat function. As previously mentioned under chapter 4.1, this 
criterion differs from the “unless and for such time”-criterion. The key to the difference in 
status is “membership”. While serving a continuous combat function the member waivers 
his or her initial civilian right to protection.    
 
Continuous combat function is a new term to the IHL, and appeared for the first time in the 
Interpretive Guidance. As depicted above, the necessity of such term has been following 
the increasing occurrence of acts of terror and by the development in weaponry. 
 
The term “organized armed group” is generally seen as contrary to regular State armed 
forces. Under an IAC the term usually comprises irregular armed forces belonging to a 
State (such as certain militias, volunteer corps and organized resistance groups).
128
 In a 
NIAC an organized armed group usually refers to the armed forces of a non-state party to 
the conflict.
129
 The Interpretive Guidance has chosen to define “organized armed groups” 
as irregular constituted armed forces of a State or a non-State party to an armed conflict.
130
 
In order for an organized armed group to, per definition, belong to a party to the conflict, it 
must be a de facto relationship between the organized armed group in question and a party 
to the conflict. In practice this means that the organized armed group must conduct 
hostilities on behalf of and in agreement with that party. This clarifies the status of 
“independent” armed groups, leaving its members with status as civilian according to the 
HagueReg, the GCs and its APs
 131
 unless the level of violence reaches the threshold of 
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intensity and organization where the independent armed group become a party to a separate 
armed conflict. If the situation escalates to that point, its members will change status from 
civilians to members of an organized armed group. 
 
According to the Interpretive Guidance individuals assuming a continuous combat function 
are persons whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or commands 
of acts or operations amounting to DPH.
132
 However, it will be an undeniable practical 
challenge to distinguish the members of an organized armed group who have a continuous 
combat function and thereby may be attacked at any time, from those who do not have a 
continuous combat function but who on occasions pick up arms and thereby have the status 
of a civilian directly participating in hostilities who can only be lawfully targeted 
accordingly with “unless and for such time”. When an individual is positively identified 
having directly participated in hostilities on a previous occasion, how can the adversary 
know whether that was a periodic engagement or an operation conducted on behalf of an 
organized armed group and the individual assumes a continuous combat function? During 
the planning of a military operation, it is a practical challenge to acquire adequate 
information in order to decide whether or not a civilian meets all the conditions of DPH.  
The adversary must be equipped to distinguish between the “unless and for such time”- 
individual who has walked through the revolving door reassumed his or her protected status 
as a civilian and the member of an organized armed group assuming a continuous combat 
function and thereby having entailed a loss of protection. According to 50 (1) 2
nd
 sentence 
AP I this means that in all cases of doubt, the individual in question must be considered to 
be a civilian.
133
 This shakes the whole foundation of the concept of continuous combat 
function, as the concept is built on function, rather than formal membership. Like 
combatants, those with a continuous combat function may be attacked on the basis of their 
status alone. Another challenge is where a combatant is in a situation that acquires him or 
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her to act in self defense, and he or she must make a split-second decision on whether or 
not the attacking individual is a lawful target. 
 
The Commentary on the APs
134
 emphasizes that “those who belong to armed forces or 
armed groups may be attacked at any time.” This is in accordance with the notion of 
continuous combat function. It is in attempt to prevent members of an organized armed 
group from gaining an operational advantage over members of State armed forces, that the 
first mentioned only walk through the revolving door by assuming or stepping out of a 
continuous combat function. As mentioned above under chapter 4.2, during the First Expert 
Meeting
135
 it was a broad agreement among the experts that members of the armed forces 
are lawful targets at all times for the duration of an armed conflict, based on their 
entitlement to take up arms any time. If the loss of protection against direct attack should 
be limited in equivalence to the “unless and for such time” exception in DPH, the members 
of organized armed groups would gain an irrational operational advantage over members of 
State armed forces.  
 
5.1 The membership approach 
For the purpose of this paper, the membership approach will reflect the perspective of the 
Interpretive Guidance. However, for the purpose of discussion, it will be given an account 
for Israel‟s membership approach by the example of the Targeted Killing Judgment.  
 
The Interpretive Guidance operates with a functional criterion for membership. Whenever 
referring to membership in an organized armed group, the Interpretive Guidance means 
membership based on continuous combat function, not based on formal membership. 
Membership in an organized armed group determined by functional criteria has been 
criticized because of the difficulty of establishing a civilian participant‟s future intent on 
past practice. However, members of organized armed groups belonging to a party to a 
conflict, who assume a continuous combat function involving the preparation, execution, or 
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command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities, lose 
protection from attack for such time. Members of an organized armed group who do not 
regularly perform combat duties continue to enjoy full civilian protection from attack 
unless they directly participate in hostilities. Adversely, members of the armed forces and 
participants in a levee en masse do not qualify as civilians, and may therefore be attacked 
based solely on their status as such, regardless of whether they are directly participating in 
hostilities at the time of attack.  
 
Critics
136
 have pointed out the unfortunate imbalance between members of organized 
armed groups and members of state military forces; even when membership is indisputable 
established, a member of an organized armed group cannot lawfully be attacked unless 
admitting a continuous combat function, whereas a member of a state armed force is a 
lawful target even when established that he or she does not perform any functions 
amounting to the equivalent of DPH. In the Targeted Killing Judgment the issue of 
membership is addressed in connection with terrorist organizations. “In its war against 
terrorism, the State of Israel employs various means. As part of the security activity 
intended to confront the terrorist attacks, the State employs what it calls “the policy of 
targeted frustration” of terrorism. Under this policy, the security forces act in order to kill 
members of terrorist organizations involved in the planning, launching, or execution of 
terrorist attacks against Israel.”137 
 
The judgment dismisses any personnel categories beside “combatants” and “civilians”. In 
the discussion concerning members of terrorist organizations petitioners note that the State 
refuses to grant those members rights and protections in accordance with IHL, with “The 
result […] that the State wishes to treat them according to the worse of the two worlds: as 
combatants, regarding the justification for killing them, and as civilians, regarding the need 
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to arrest them and try them. This result is unacceptable.”138 The Targeted Killing Judgment 
acknowledges the difficulty in the issue of correct and proper classification of terrorist 
organizations and its members. Professor Dinstein gives emphasis to a third category, by 
saying that “a person who engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an 
innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful 
combatant.”139     
 
During the Second Expert Meeting
140
 several experts agreed on the importance of 
distinguishing between the armed wing of an organized armed group and its other sections, 
ensuring that only the members whose job it is to conduct DPH can be regarded as military 
targets. Furthermore, it was suggested that one should identify who is targetable within a 
state‟s armed forces and then apply the same criteria to non-state armed groups. By doing 
that, it would be easier to determine whether one particular member of an organized armed 
group could be directly targeted. If implemented, the concept would definitely be of 
practical use, though it will require resourceful intelligence to gain such knowledge about 
the internal structure and hierarchy of all organized armed groups participating in an armed 
conflict. The Interpretive Guidance responds to this challenge by stating that the distinction 
must be made based upon “information which is practically available and can reasonably 
be regarded as reliable in the prevailing circumstances.”141 Furthermore, it acknowledges 
another challenge by saying “In practice, the informal and clandestine structures of most 
organized armed groups and the elastic nature of membership render it particularly difficult 
to distinguish between a non-State party to the conflict and its armed forces.” As an 
interpretive guidance the Interpretive Guidance must be careful when giving criteria upon 
which a distinction between a military target and a civilian object will be based. Finding a 
functional solution generally applicable in practical situations is difficult. Disengagement 
from an organized armed group sends the civilian back through the revolving door 
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regaining his or her protected status, and can be expressed explicitly or implicitly by 
conclusive behavior.
142
 
 
The question is whether or not a mere membership in an organized armed group can 
qualify as DPH. According to Article 43 (2) AP I members of armed forces
143
 of a party to 
the conflict are combatants and thereby entitled to conduct DPH. If membership in an 
organized armed group will result in loss of the civilian immunity against direct attack, it 
will be in conflict with the rules established in Article 43 AP I concerning armed forces. 
 
Professor Solis depicts a situation using a mere member of al Qaeda as an example. His 
conclusion is that according to traditional IHL mere membership without a continuous 
combat function is not enough to make an al Qaeda member a lawful target.
144
 However, if 
there is a Common Article 3 armed conflict in progress and the al Qaeda member is 
directly participating in the Common Article 3 armed conflict, either as an individual 
assuming a continuous combat function or as a spontaneous, unorganized act, the member 
might be targeted. This illustrates the requirement of DPH in NIACs as well as in IACs. 
The direct participation must be in connection with hostilities during an armed conflict. 
 
The membership approach was discussed during the Fourth Expert Meeting, “leading to the 
conclusion that a generalized membership approach was too wide and had to be restricted 
to those members who continuously assumed a combatant function, because that category 
best corresponded to the concept of “armed forces” of a party to the conflict.” 145 
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5.2 The revolving door mechanism 
The mechanism referred to as the “revolving door” is also referred to as “farmer by day and 
fighter by night”. The term “unless and for such time”146 is applicable in both the situation 
where a civilian conduct DHP only once never to do it again, and in the situation where a 
person continuously conduct DPH and deliberately take advantage of his or her protected 
status. In the latter situation the civilian will step in and out of protection (like through a 
revolving door), losing protection from attack for the duration of a specific hostile act, 
regaining protection in between military operations. The revolving door constitutes a 
serious practical challenge for the adversary having to implement different and constantly 
changing legal regimes in relation to the same person.
147
 For the duration of directly 
participating in hostilities the civilian is a lawful target, but “unless and for such time” he 
or she is protected against direct attack and if found and held accountable, he or she must 
be prosecuted under domestic law.  
 
During the Vietnam War the Viet Cong organized peasants in the territory under their 
control, making them “farmers by day and fighters by night” in their fight against the US 
and the South Vietnamese government. In 1977, three years after the end of the Vietnam 
War, the GC I-IV APs were constituted. The concept of DPH has been discussed before the 
Interpretive Guidance, but the element of membership is new to the discussion.  
     
As mentioned above, the notion of continuous combat function concerning members or 
organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party was introduced for the first time in 
the Interpretive Guidance. According to what is previously discussed under this chapter, 
the attempt to balance the legal position between state armed forces and organized armed 
groups by lessening the traffic through the revolving door, has altered the traditional 
“unless and for such time”-criterion for this group by adding the membership-criterion. 
However, the practical changes have not managed to gain footing yet.   
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6 TARGETING – Operationalizing the Interpretive Guidance 
As a general principle of law, a person shall be held innocent until proven guilty. In IHL, a 
person shall be considered a civilian in cases of doubt. How can there be made a 
practicable general rule distinguishing between those with a continuous combat function 
from those who lose protection against attack only unless and for such time they take a 
direct part in hostilities? In cases where a civilian is caught while conducting the act, this 
distinction is irrelevant. The same must apply when a civilian is caught in conducting 
measures preparatory, deployment or proven returning from a military operation having 
conducted DPH. However, as one rarely can know for sure the accurate network position 
an individual holds within an organized armed group, the concept of continuous combat 
function is difficult to deal with in a practicable way. An alternative is, in cases where 
formal membership in an organized armed group is established, that these members 
regardless of role and function shall be lawful targets to the adverse. The dysfunctional 
element in this alternative is how to distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary 
members. Even based upon the criterion of formal (as opposed to functional) membership, 
there is a danger of creating a paradox by making involuntary members lawful targets and 
thereby conducting a second offence towards such individuals. How to make targeting 
decisions concerning those whose formal membership cannot be established, is another 
challenge. If making formal membership a criterion documenting status, there must still be 
a subsidizing rule covering this group. Most likely, it will be impossible to create 
guidelines universally applicable comprising anything more than “regular” DPH. In 
accordance with this perspective, the concept of continuous combat function cannot apply 
in cases not already covered by Article 51 (3) AP I and Article 13 (3) AP II.    
 
6.1 Targeting decisions 
When making a targeting decision, all of the four core principles of IHL
148
 are involved, in 
particular the principle of distinction. The distinction between civilians and combatants, 
and between civilian objects and military objectives, must be made as lawful attacks only 
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can be directed towards combatants and military objectives. In the planning of a military 
attack, the element of military necessity must be the first principle to be considered. If the 
planners decide that the targeting is a military necessity, the extent and volume of potential 
loss of civilian lives must be mapped. If the planners decide that proportionality is 
quantified, the military attack must be carried out in accordance with the rules of 
precautions in attack in Article 57 AP I. Furthermore, in the planning and targeting 
decision arms that will cause unnecessary suffering must be avoided. In addition to these 
four principles, Article 51 (4) AP I (“the indiscrimination rule”149) applies. The Article (a) 
and (b) establish the principle of distinction, whereas the Article (c) establishes the 
principle of proportionality. 
 
As opposed to a direct attack against civilians, an indiscriminate attack is not intentionally 
trying to harm the civilian population. According to Professor Dinstein “The key to finding 
that a certain attack has been indiscriminate is the nonchalant state of mind of the attacker. 
Any reconstruction of that state of mind must, however, factor in the habitual “fog of war”, 
recalling that the information available to the attacker in real time may have been faulty or 
incomplete.”150 An example is the area bombing of Elverum (“Elverumsfullmakten”) in 
1940 where the Germans were targeting the Norwegian King and Government as they were 
trying to leave the country. The bombing caused harm and destruction excessive to the 
actual target.  
 
Another established example of an indiscriminate attack is from the Gulf War I where the 
Al Furdos bunker in central Baghdad was bombed in 1991 by U.S. Air Force, killing over 
200 people, most of them civilians. The bombing took place late at night when only a small 
number of military personnel would be inside. It is indisputable that the bunker was a 
lawful military target as it functioned as an important command and control center and also 
as the secret police headquarters. However, the bunker also served as an air-raid shelter for 
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the families of the military personnel assigned to the bunker. The Americans relied on 
intelligence evidence indicating the military importance of the bunker, and denied having 
any knowledge of the dual-use.
151
   
 
6.2 Rules Of Engagement 
Rules of engagement are not IHL and the two must therefore be differentiated from one 
another. The term “ROE” does not appear in either the GCs or the APs. ROE are not 
domestic law, and not treaty law, they are military directives issued by a single country, an 
international organization or a military alliance.
152
 They rest upon national policy and 
operational requirements as well as upon law. The purpose of ROE is to regulate the use of 
force in armed conflict, primarily in order to make sure to avoid an unintentional outbreak 
of war, or in order to avoid the escalation of an ongoing conflict, to secure political 
governing or to make sure that the public international law is implemented where 
required.
153
 The foundation of ROE is customary law, IHL, military missions and political 
objectives.
154
   
 
Both NATO and the UN have developed documents and methods for ROE applicable for 
military operations based on a mandate from a resolution from the UN Security Council. 
The process of composing ROE is thorough, and when a ROE is authorized, the 
interpretation of how to implement the ROE must be done within the political context of 
which the ROE was composed. The ROE are meant to function as an interpretive guidance 
or as a support element in order to carry out operations within the frame of national 
legislation.     
 
In peacekeeping operations, the use of force is limited to the act of self defense, which 
means that a ROE challenge will be the definition of self defense. The specified content of 
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the right to self defense is often embodied in Standing Rules of Force (SRUF) given by 
national governments. Although ROE are supposed to be of a dynamic character in order 
for its function to be optimal, the SRUF do not change from mission to mission. They stay 
the same, and the threshold of when acts of self defense can be conducted differs from one 
national government to another.
155
 Naturally it will create practical challenges in NATO 
operations, when some membership states will act in self defense on the criterion of 
established hostile intent, while others will be under a more reserved SRUF. Opinions on 
how soon after an attack an act of self defense may be conducted will also differ. Does the 
right to self defense include the right to neutralize a threat? The respect for the “blue 
line”156 is another element that might be interpreted more literally by some than by 
others.
157
 
 
The USS Cole bombing was a suicide attack against the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole 
(DDG67) that took place on 12 October 2000 in Aden, Yemen. The al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility for the attack that killed 17 American sailors and injured another 39. The 
USS Cole sailors guarding the destroyer had instructions not to fire at suspicious craft. On 
orders of their captain they were carrying unloaded guns and were ordered not to fire unless 
fired on. An extract by an article Stephen Robinson from The Daily Telegraph published on 
15 November, 2000
158
 describes the situation of ROE like this: 
“Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick, a sonar technician who survived the attack, said: "If we had shot those 
people, we'd have gotten in trouble for it. That's what's frustrating about it. We would have gotten in more 
trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing 17 American sailors." 
                                                 
155
 l.c. 
156
 The ”blue line” is the geographical operational area of a UN Force 
157
 See Dahl (2008), p. 400 
158
 See Robinson, Stephen (15 November 2000). "Bombed US warship was defended by sailors with 
unloaded guns". The Daily Telegraph (London: Sunday Telegraph). 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-
defended-by-sailors-with-unloaded-guns.html. Retrieved 24 September 2010. 
 50 
Petty Officer John Washak was carrying an M60 machine gun at the stern when the ship was attacked. 
Seconds after the explosion and with blood on his face, he pointed his gun at a second craft to warn it off, 
believing - incorrectly - that the Cole was still under attack. Even then a senior petty officer ordered him to 
point the gun away, reminding him: "That's the rules of engagement: no shooting unless we're shot at."” 
The term “hostile intent” is considered a possible criterion for a lawful act of self defense 
as a part of the technical terminology of ROE. In the context of hostilities, hostile intent 
does not have requirements of equivalence to “intent” in criminal proceedings. During the 
Third Expert Meeting
159
 hostile intent was unanimously rejected as a requirement in 
determining DPH. Hostile intent has been of a particular interest in situations where the 
enemy engages in activities with no direct application of violence, such as CNAs.
 160
 
However, even as a criterion under ROE, one must be careful when using hostile intent as a 
justification for the use of lethal force against civilians, as it can be a practical challenge to 
draw the line in determining and proving intent.  
 
6.3 Targeted killings  
A targeted killing can be defined as “the intentional killing of a specific civilian or 
unlawful combatant who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in 
hostilities, the targeting done at the direction of the state, in the context of an international 
or non-international armed conflict”.161 In the Interpretive Guidance section IX, the “kill or 
capture”-discussion takes place in light of the principle of military necessity and the 
principle of humanity. For the purpose of this paper, I will not address that discussion here. 
The topic will, under this chapter, be limited to (targeted) killings.  
 
Whether or not targeted killings are prohibited must narrow down to the circumstances of 
each specific killing. All enemy combatants in IAC can be lawfully targeted at all times, 
unless the combatant has retired from military service or become hors de combat.
162
 The 
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targeting of lawful combatants includes taking out high-ranked commanders and other 
individual combatants who serve an important military function. Understood as killings of 
individual enemy combatants, targeted killings are not prohibited under the LOIAC.
163
  
 
Targeted killing has become a common tactic in fighting terrorists. Sometimes it can be 
disputable where to draw the line between a politically motivated assassination and a 
tactically motivated targeted killing. Looking at the definition of targeted killing by 
Professor Solis, it is, however, a criterion that the targeted killing takes place during an 
ongoing armed conflict. The person who authorizes a targeted killing must have targeting 
authority. Several governments, including the U.S., Israel, the U.K., Germany, Russia, 
Pakistan and Switzerland, have acknowledged to have resorted to targeted killings in their 
fight against terrorist activities.
164
 The concept of national self-defense constitutes the 
justification for targeted killing. In Yemen on 3 November 2002, a CIA-operated Predator 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fired Hellfire missiles at a SUV-style automobile carrying 
Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a man believed to be an al-Qaeda senior lieutenant who has 
been suspected to play a role in the USS Cole bombing. There were five other men with 
Qaed al-Harethi in the vehicle, including the U.S. citizen Kamal Derwish, and all six men 
were killed. The killing was condemned by human rights organizations as an execution, 
without any trial or proof of guilt. Such objections, amongst others, triggered the birth of 
the Interpretive Guidance.
165
 
 
The lawfulness of a targeted killing reflects back to the very topic of this paper: the 
interpretation of DPH. It is a criterion for the targeting of a civilian that the targeted 
individual is directly participating in hostilities.
 166
 The participation can be through a 
continuous combat function or as a spontaneous unorganized act.   
                                                 
163
 Ibid., p. 103 
164
 See Solis (2010), p. 539-543 
165
 Ibid., p. 540  
166
 See Art. 51 (3) AP I, 13 (3) AP II 
 52 
7 CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD  
 
7.1 Conclusion 
Throughout the time and effort spent trying to make the Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law 
practicable to operational forces, I have from time to time felt overwhelmed by all the 
challenges. I have not succeeded in finding a simple solution, but I have learnt to recognize 
the difficulties in attempting to make theory meet with the real world. But most 
importantly, I have grown to be convinced that finding ways to make the rules of IHL 
sufficiently practicable can be done. War is chaotic, which means that we must accept a 
generalization in order to implement the LOAC. 
 
Prior to the GCs AP I, the IHL consisted of two branches, still known as “The Hague Law” 
and “Geneva Law”. The first mentioned embodies a set of rules concerning the conduct of 
hostilities, which in addition to the GCs AP I carries the purpose of protecting the 
combatants from unnecessary suffering. The latter comprises a set of rules which protects 
the victims of war, such as civilians and combatants who are hors de combat. After the 
GCs 1977 AP I these two branches converged into the IHL as we know it today. The 
mandate of today‟s IHL is to protect both combatants and civilians. Unfortunately, 
sometimes reality creates “catch -22 situations”, confronting members of the operational 
forces with heavy decisions regarding targeting and protection. 
 
It is indisputable that combatants are lawful targets, and conversely, that civilians enjoy 
protection against direct attack. However, the confusion enters with the notion of DPH. 
Unlike combatants who are lawful targets at all times (even while being asleep), civilians 
who directly participate in hostilities are lawful targets only for the duration of their 
conduct of DPH. The notion of DPH requires tools which can be used in determining when 
and for how long a civilian can be lawfully targeted. This is particularly a challenge in 
NIACs where the frequency of organized armed groups is high. The Interpretive Guidance 
has given members of these groups a separate criterion entailing loss of protection.   
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The membership criterion is based upon a continuous combat function and is in addition to 
the criterion of the conduct of DPH. Membership by function is, according to the 
Interpretive Guidance, the documentation clarifying the status of participants of organized 
armed groups. However, this approach has been the subject of massive debate because of 
all the challenges in making the criterion practicable. One of the weaknesses in this 
approach is the requiring of heavy intelligence. Another is the challenge of making sure 
that members of organized armed groups do not enjoy excessive operational advantages 
compared to the state armed forces. 
 
7.2 Way forward   
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the challenges of distinguishing combatants 
from civilians are growing, while the importance of making such distinction does not 
decrease. The laws, rules and regulations applying to operational forces participating in 
armed conflicts are many. The complexity of armed conflicts entails a corresponding 
complexity in the rules, which requires knowledge and understanding from the combatants. 
In order for the combatants to be equipped to make decisions while in the field, the internal 
military educational system must make it a general priority to put IHL on the agenda. If 
being expected to apply IHL, the operational forces must be given a practicable guidance to 
follow, and the combatants must be taught and trained to interpret the guidance. At this 
point the operational forces have no clear guidance offering support when determining 
DPH. This means that there are still a lot of uncertainties around when a civilian can 
lawfully be targeted. As earlier mentioned, in situations of doubt of an individual‟s civilian 
status, he or she shall be considered a civilian enjoying immunity against direct attack.
167
 
The combination of the lack of a clear and practicable guidance and Article 50 (1) 2
nd
 
sentence AP I, may create situations of paralysation, making the operational forces unable 
to act. Without a clear manual, the operational forces may end up in situation similar to the 
example above where the ROE limited the USS Cole American sailors‟ alternatives of 
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acting to the verge of incapacitation.  Hopefully, the ICRC‟s Interpretive Guidance will 
continue to be developed to the point of one day serving such function. 
  
In addition to putting IHL on the agenda of the military educational system, the political 
awareness must promote acceptance and understanding around the challenges the 
operational forces are faced with while participating in armed conflicts, especially as a part 
of multinational forces, as described in the introduction.   
 
Lasting internal conflicts and non-international armed conflicts in Russia, China and in the 
Middle East are of direct relevance concerning Norway‟s strategic position and raise 
fundamental questions regarding terrorism and the distribution of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).
168
 War does concern the nation even in times of peace in our own 
country. 
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